Modern Liberal Research Articles

Communication Strategy for Deliberalization of Islamic Thought at UNIDA Gontor

Liberalism, when viewed from its development, has two main streams that mutually use the term liberal. Classical liberalism or economic liberalism emphasizes individual freedom in carrying out activities in the economic field, and social liberalism, emphasizes the state's role in defending individual rights, usually formed as anti-discrimination laws. In addition to the trend of liberalization which emphasizes economic, political, and social rights, liberalism is also found in the field of religious thought. Indeed, liberalism in Western civilization's social and political fields has slowly separated religion from social and political affairs. Religion has no place in social and political interests. Concepts such as pluralism, multiculturalism, feminism, gender equality, democratization, humanism, freedom, and human rights are several layers of elements in the liberalization movement. Even theses and dissertations in Islamic universities are written to seek Islamic justification for these concepts. To stem this massive liberalization movement, researchers take the example of preventing the liberalization of Islamic thought in Islamic tertiary institutions, namely at the University of Darussalam (UNIDA) Gontor. This type of research is qualitative, with in-depth interview data collection techniques, and data analysis techniques namely triangulation of data sources (results of interviews and previous research). The result of this research is that UNIDA Gontor uses a curriculum based on the Islamization of Science. In addition, Islamization activities are also carried out through weekly student discussions guided by mentors, bi-weekly studies for lecturers and staff, scientific papers written by students and lecturers, and community service activities.

To STEM or not to STEM: A cross-national analysis of gender and tertiary graduates in science, technology, engineering, and math, 1998–2018

The comparative literature on gender and higher education has increasingly focused on differences in access to the fields of science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM). We contribute to this literature through a cross-national analysis of STEM graduates by gender between 1998 and 2018 across 90 countries. Many earlier studies emphasize the positive influence of a global liberal culture on women. More recent scholarship contends that women may be steered away from attaining a STEM degree in more liberal and individualistic societies. Our study shows a lower percentage of women graduates in STEM in countries that are more liberal. However, we find that the opposite is the case for men. Our findings are consistent with the idea that individuals in more liberal cultural contexts are more likely to make degree decisions based on individual preferences that are influenced by gendered societal norms. Both women and men are more likely to “indulge in their gendered selves” in these cultural contexts. Our findings are inconsistent with the idea that liberal modernity influences men and women in STEM in a gender-neutral mode.

Confronting well-being and mental health in the ‘therapeutic university’: implications for educators, students and the curriculum

ABSTRACT This is a conceptual paper that examines the emergence of the ‘therapeutic university’ and considers its potential implications for policy and practice in Higher Education (HE). Concern over the well-being and mental health of university students both in the United Kingdom (UK) and internationally has recently intensified in media, academic and political spheres, to the extent that Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) are increasingly offering a diverse range of ad-hoc initiatives and practices based on the language and techniques of an equally diverse popular psychology. An emotionally oriented ‘therapeutic university’ (TU) is emerging from a complex intertwining of policies of social liberalism, specifically widening participation, and policies of economic liberalism which seek to cultivate the higher education (HE) sector as a competitive marketplace. While the TU might appear to offer the potential to alleviate mental health conditions, these therapeutic practices are frequently conceived as self-evidently good and rarely subjected to any critical scrutiny. This article explores three inter-related sets of concerns regarding the implications of the TU for educators, students and the curriculum and, through an exploratory account, illustrates these trends from our own lived experiences of working within a TU. Framed by insights from critical pedagogy, we critically analyse the current well-being agenda in the British HE sector and how this positions educators as ‘agents of well-being’ rather than ‘agents of criticality’.

Welfare stigma in a social democratic welfare regime during a decade of national public debate: production, contestation and continuities

ABSTRACT The aim of this article is to investigate how welfare stigma is produced and counteracted in the public sphere in a social democratic welfare regime. The Norwegian case represents a generous welfare state that historically has been thought to lessen and avoid stigma connected to welfare benefits. While studies have identified a hardening anti-welfare consensus and stigma production in liberal welfare regimes, we know less about how the connection between welfare benefits, stigma production and resistance has played out in the recent developments in the social democratic welfare regime context. Public debates give access to a dynamic political battleground where different actors participate, and we analyse six welfare-related national debates covered in Norwegian newspapers between 2010 and 2019. We identify key stakeholders, symbolic boundaries used to distinguish deserving from undeserving recipients, and we discuss the outcomes and wider functions of these debates. The debates contain moral aspects of welfare and allegations of fraud by recipients in general as well as by targeted groups such as Somali single mothers, refugees and young adults. We find that stigmatizing framings known from other national contexts also enter the Norwegian debates and illustrate how welfare stigma production plays a role in promoting more selective welfare policies.

Predicting political beliefs with polygenic scores for cognitive performance and educational attainment

Intelligence is correlated with a range of left-wing and liberal political beliefs. This may suggest intelligence directly alters our political views. Alternatively, the association may be confounded or mediated by socioeconomic and environmental factors. We studied the effect of intelligence within a sample of over 300 biological and adoptive families, using both measured IQ and polygenic scores for cognitive performance and educational attainment. We found both IQ and polygenic scores significantly predicted all six of our political scales. Polygenic scores predicted social liberalism and lower authoritarianism, within-families. Intelligence was able to significantly predict social liberalism and lower authoritarianism, within families, even after controlling for socioeconomic variables. Our findings may provide the strongest causal inference to date of intelligence directly affecting political beliefs.

What Went Wrong In Hungary

Abstract: Why did Hungarian democracy have a harder time developing and rooting itself than democracy in other countries? The answer lies in the overlapping institutions and incentives that create democratic resilience. Hungary's political elites never finished their constitutional transition from communism to democracy by agreeing on a new democratic constitution. The 1998 elections polarized Hungarian politics around competing conceptions of democracy in ways that made it hard to reach consensus on a shared constitutional arrangement. Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party rose to power in the late 1990s by offering a strong state that would protect Hungarian society from the threat of social liberalism and foreclose a potential return of communism. Orbán returned to power in 2010, on the heels of the global financial crisis, and began centralizing and entrenching power by deft manipulation of democratic institutions. The case of Hungary tells us what to look for in anticipating democratic failure and serves as a cautionary tale for the EU.

Book Review: Galen Watts, The Spiritual Turn: The Religion of the Heart and the Making of the Romantic Liberal Modernity

Book Review: Galen Watts, The Spiritual Turn: The Religion of the Heart and the Making of the Romantic Liberal Modernity

A Kingdom of Possibility

Introduction The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the largest country in the Middle East. Lying within the heart of the Arabian Peninsula, it borders the Red Sea to the west; Jordan, Iraq, and Kuwait to the north; the Persian Gulf, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates to the east; and Oman and Yemen to the south. The foundation of Saudi Arabia may be largely credited to two main historical figures who lived in the first half of the eighteenth century. The first figure, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, was a devout Islamic scholar and religious activist who fervently condemned the increasing tendencies of local peoples toward idolatrous practices. He preached the need for a return to stricter adherence to the original principles of Islam, based on devotion to the doctrine of the ‘absolute unity of God’ as passed through, and enunciated by, the witness of God’s word, Prophet Muhammad (Rentz). In present-day Saudi Arabia, reverence to Prophet Muhammad’s divine revelations and divinely appointed role, as accentuated by al-Wahhab, remains inscribed on the national flag (fig. 1), which states: “there is no god but Allah; Muhammad is the messenger of God”. Figure 1: The flag of Saudi Arabia Although initially met with opposition, al-Wahhab’s eventual encounter in 1744 with the ruler of the Najd town of Diriyah, Muhammad ibn Saud, led to “the drastic change in the course of Arabian history” (Rentz 16), after both men pledged an oath and alliance in pursuit of a successful religious, political, and military expansion campaign that saw Diriyah become the first Saudi state and original home to the Al-Saud dynasty (MoFA). It was not until 1932, however, that the nation-state of Saudi Arabia was officially formed, establishing Abdulaziz bin Abdulrahman Al-Saud (often known as Ibn Saud) as the first officially recognised ruling monarch and patriarch of the modern House of Saud. In only a few short decades since the date of unification, the once poor desert landscape comprised of rivalling nomadic tribes has undergone astonishing transformations, making the present-day unified Kingdom a key strategic regional and international actor within world politics, and a major economical, technological, and military power and rival. In addition to being a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), for example, Saudi Arabia is also an active and founding member of international organisations such as the United Nations, the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (OAS). Notably, Saudi Arabia’s influence and eminence in the international arena specifically pertains to its leading role within OPEC, given that Saudi Arabia’s command economy is largely petroleum-based. Here, Saudi Arabia is the “largest generator of net oil export revenue” for OPEC, and the “largest OPEC crude oil exporter” (Statista); in 2022, Saudi Arabia’s oil export revenues totalled US$311 billion (Statista). Unsurprisingly, the House of Saud is the wealthiest royal family in the world, worth an estimated US$1.4 trillion (Hieu), a figure four times the combined wealth of billionaires Elon Musk (worth an estimated US$236.1 billion) and Bill Gates (worth an estimated US$119.7 billion). The combined wealth of the House of Saud also significantly surpasses the worth of the renowned British royal family, whose combined wealth pales in comparison at an estimated US$28 billion (Hieu; Srinivasan). Arguably, the net worth of the House of Saud not only financially ranks them among the top tier of elites, but also makes them one of the most powerful royal families in the world (Hieu). Presently, the nation remains an absolute monarchy under a Sharia legal system, in accordance with Islamic law as principally derived from the Quran (holy book) and Sunnah (the saying, traditions, and practices of Prophet Muhammad). Absolute monarchism denotes that no political parties or national elections are permitted, and that the reigning monarch executes predominant control over legislative and internal civil affairs. Comparatively, a constitutional monarchy such as that of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland denotes that the powers held by the reigning monarch in their position as head of state are more symbolic and ceremonial. As such, the House of Windsor often rely significantly on consumerist culture as a means for maintaining their monarchical legitimacy, and relevance and ‘celebrity’, particularly within its Commonwealth settler nations (Randell-Moon). The rule of the House of Saud has often been controversially labelled by critics as totalitarian (Bandow), particularly for the limited freedoms of expression and association afforded to its citizens, where “controversy is discouraged, and conformity is encouraged” (Faksh & Hendrickson 1171); as Faksh and Hendrickson (1171) surmise, “the system offers little scope for the expression of competing views, much less for acting on them”. Nonetheless, the prevailing system of government in Saudi Arabia, currently under the patronage of King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, led to the creation of one of the most uniquely curated sovereign powers, whose rise and affluence is, in part, largely testament to the loyalty of its citizenry to its monarchy. The Saudi government provides its citizens with a range of benefits, including exemption from personal income tax, free education (including tertiary) and healthcare, as well as government-subsidised handouts. In 2018, for example, King Salman ordered the government to pay around 1.18 million Saudis working in the public sector 1,000 Saudi Riyals (SAR) (approximately US$266) per month to “offset increasing costs of living” (Perper); for Alawwad (cited in Perper), “the allocation of 50 billion Riyals (approximately US$13 billion) for this decree indicates the leadership’s concern for the people’s comfort and quality of living. The modern-day rule of Saudi royalty may be seen as reminiscent of the foundational traditions and customs on which the nation was formed, “much like a sheikh of a tribe who is in close touch with the concerns of his tribesmen and keeps those concerns in balance” (Faksh & Hendrickson 1171). The Saudi monarchy that has thus emerged may be seen to radically differ from Western concepts of the institution: “no Sun King, no pomp elevating the monarch far above the common breed, not even a crown or a throne” (Rentz 15). This article discusses the growth of the House of Saud – from nomadic warriors principally guided by the foundations of Islam to entrepreneurs determined to bridge the gap in the Kingdom between tradition and modernity, conservatism and social liberalism, nationalism and internationalism. The Founding Monarchs, Black Gold, and Foreign Relations Prior to the official unification of Saudi Arabia in 1932, the House of Saud considered the UK a close ally, particularly with regard to British support received in relation to the defeat of the Ottoman conquest in the Arabia Peninsula (Nonneman). During World War I, for example, Ibn Saud (then ruler of Najd and al-Ahsa, and later founder of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) signed the 1915 Treaty of Darin (or ‘Anglo-Saudi’ Treaty) with the British government, granting the regions under Ibn Saud’s rule the status of a British protectorate (Wilkinson; Dahlan). In the years that followed the signing of the treaty, Britain also granted Ibn Saud “a loan of [₤]20,000 and a shipment of arms”, as well as a monthly stipend of ₤5,000 from 1917 to 1924 (Nonneman 640). This stipend was granted as a token for the “consolidation of the new Saudi polity, through military means and acts of patronage and generosity towards both [Ibn Saud’s] supporters and many of his vanquished foes” (Nonneman 640). In 1927, the Treaty of Darin was supplanted by the Treaty of Jeddah, which affirmed the British government’s recognition of absolute independence of Ibn Saud’s rulership as King of Najd and Hejaz and its dependencies – the ‘dual Kingdom’ later unified and renamed to Saudi Arabia (Nonneman). Undoubtedly, the discovery of ‘black gold’ in Saudi Arabia had, and continues to have, significant influence on the nation’s identify formation, the extent of its socioeconomic growth, and the Saudi monarchy’s political prowess. Given the strength of the alliance between the state under Ibn Saud and the UK in the early twentieth century, Ibn Saud awarded a UK-based company its first petroleum concession in 1923; after four years, however, the company was unable to strike any oil and the contract was not renewed. A second sixty-year concession that was awarded to the US-based Standard Oil Company of California (now known as the Arabian American Oil Company, or ARAMCO) in 1933 would, however, not only mark a significant turning-point for the Saudi economy, but also for Saudi foreign relations thereafter (Al-Farsy). According to Al-Farsy (45), Ibn Saud’s “concession to the American firm at that time represented a major break with what was virtually a British monopoly of petroleum concession in that part of the world”. Notably, the House of Saud also received ‘advantageous’ offers from both Japan and Germany for oil ‘diplomacy’ in the late 1930s (Al-Farsy). Ibn Saud believed, however, that the Axis Powers were instead “motivated by political considerations” (Al-Farsy 47) and were “aware of the strategic value of the Middle East, situated as it was on the lines of communication with her new European partners” (Katakura 263). As such, Ibn Saud “preferred to continue his association with the Americans” as it had “the advantage of assuring the economic development of the country without incurring political liabilities” (Al-Farsy 47). World War II, thus, markedly represented a unique epoch for the House of Saud, characterised by an expansion of diplomatic missions beyond Europe to America (Beling). From Warrior to Diplomat Ibn Saud was considered a warrior of “towering achievements” (Almana 295) – a “truly remarkable man” of discipline and faith, both values which were “essential for success in his harsh desert land” (296). In his biographical text of the late monarch, Almana (296-7) intimately describes how the successes of Ibn Saud’s feats demanded his observance of a rigid daily routine which began at 4.30 a.m. before the morning prayer. The activities of the day revolved around the other prayer times, culminating in the evening prayer before His Majesty went to his bed. In fact, the King made it a rule never to sleep more than six hours out of every twenty-four… This discipline coupled with his natural physical strength enabled His Majesty to maintain a punishing schedule, both in the Court and in the desert, which would have been beyond men who lacked his faith. Ibn Saud was also a highly regarded ruler for his people who was said to have “derived simple joy from giving” (Almana 300). For Almana (303), Ibn Saud’s generous character “allied to a natural compassion and mercy” that he demonstrated even towards his enemies and those who plotted violence against him. While virtuous in their own right, Ibn Saud’s resolute and just nature often translated into an uncompromising policy of ‘utter integrity’ and ‘straightforward candour’ which foreign dignitaries found ‘disconcerting’, particularly ‘glad-handed’ politicians (Almana). While a close relationship between Saudi Arabia and the US steadily developed in the coming decades, following a diplomatic call between Ibn Saud and US President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1945, the initial encounter between the leaders, for example, is emblematic of Ibn Saud’s confronting rhetoric in political contexts: Roosevelt thrust out his hand in greeting, but His Majesty refused to take it, saying, 'How can I shake hands with you when you are assisting the Zionists against us?' Roosevelt was greatly taken aback, but he managed to carry on a conversation with the King during which he promised never to do anything which would prejudice Arab interests. (Almana 308) It was Ibn Saud’s son, King Faisal, however, who inherited and exhibited greater diplomatic expertise – a skill that arguably propelled Saudi Arabia’s international allure, and strengthened the Kingdom’s competence for critical dialogue in the international arena. Interestingly, of Ibn Saud’s 45 sons, Faisal was the only direct descendant of Saudi Arabia’s two founding figures, as discussed earlier – Muhammad ibn Saud from his father’s side, and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab from his mother’s side (Beling). As Rentz (17) wonderfully observes, Faisal personified a commemoration of the “alliance formed more than a century and a half before his birth”. Since young age, Faisal was largely entrusted with the duty of representing his father overseas with matters relating to diplomatic affairs of the state. As loosely depicted in the 2019 historical film, Born a King, a then 13-year-old Faisal was instructed by his father to lead a delegation to London in 1919 for cooperation and discussions following the Allied victory in World War I (fig. 2). This event provided Prince Faisal significant working knowledge of other languages and exposure to political protocols and forums (Beling). Throughout the 1930s and 1940s Faisal assumed the roles of Foreign Minister and Minister of the Interior, where he led national military campaigns, such as the 1934 Saudi-Yemen War, and performed diplomatic services across Europe and the US. During these decades, Faisal also played a significant role in the foundational developmental planning of agricultural and irrigation projects, oil installations, and universities within Saudi Arabia, which were greatly influenced by those he visited in his tours of the US (Beling). The passing of Ibn Saud in 1953 arguably “marked the end of traditional Bedouin-style Arabia” and welcomed a new period of transition into modernisation (Beling 10). Although often criticised for being “too ambitious” and progressive, particularly by religious clergy, Faisal nonetheless remains a revered monarch of modern Saudi history who led the House of Saud away from ultra-conservatism after his father’s death, into a territory characterised by both pioneering programs and institutions of high technology and capital intensity, and social reform initiatives such as the introduction of national television, female inclusion in education, and the abolition of slavery (Beling). Figure 2: Prince Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud’s visit to London in 1919. The Crown Prince, Reinvigorated Nationalism, and the Future of Saudi Arabia The pioneering feats and precedent established by the founding monarchs of Saudi Arabia ultimately led to an unprecedented era of power and affluence for the House of Saud, chiefly evidenced by the monarchy’s entrepreneurial renown since the 2010s. Unlike any other period of modern Saudi history, entrepreneurship has ‘pushed the enveloped’ amongst Saudi communities and youth, “defying old conjectures regarding risk aversion and value creation in the Arab world” (Yusuf & Albanawi 2). Presently, the Saudi government’s effort towards entrepreneurial motivation is one of the key factors that has contributed to a rapid economic growth of the nation, particularly through national self-sufficiency and food independence, and the creation of employment opportunities, including private business ownership (Yusuf & Albanawi). ‘Saudisation’ or ‘Nitaqat’, for example, is an ongoing initiative that aims to increase the level of employment opportunities for Saudi nationals in the private sector, as well as to reduce the government’s reliance on expatriate workers. In 2021, expatriate workers comprised approximately 76.4 percent of the private sector workforce in Saudi Arabia (Puri-Mirza). Notably, initiatives such as Saudisation represent the monarchy’s efforts toward an invigorated nationalist transformation – for Saudis, by Saudis. Spearheading Saudi Arabia’s ‘new nationalism’ is the current reigning monarch, King Salman, alongside his favourite son and protégée, and perhaps one of the most controversial figures of the twenty-first century, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (known colloquially as MBS) (Haykel; Hoffman; Davidson; fig. 3). MBS became a household name and started appearing more frequently within the public eye in 2015 when, at only 29 years of age, he was appointed by his father King Salman as Defence Minister and Secretary-General of the Royal Court. He quickly advanced in rank and position a few short years thereafter – as Crown Prince in 2017 and Prime Minister in 2022 – becoming what most commentators appropriately consider the de facto ruler of present-day Saudi Arabia. Figure 3: Photograph taken of a billboard with MBS (left) and King Salman (right) in the capital city, Riyadh, seen in front of the new financial district currently undergoing construction. The controversy surrounding MBS primarily concerns the ethos of his governance. In both internal and external political affairs of the state, MBS has a reputation for being uncompromising, and “highly motivated and hardworking, if a little combative” (Davidson 320). Holding “concentrated power to an unprecedented degree” not seen before in Saudi history, MBS’s rule has “torn up the old rules of royal family governance … imposed by the collective leadership model that characterised the Saudi regime in the past”, and “side-lined other members of the ruling family” (Davidson 320). This was particularly seen following the unanticipated removal of King Salman’s nephew, Muhammad bin Nayef (‘MBN’), and his subsequent replacement by MBS as Crown Prince in 2017. The event prompted the power father-son duo to dramatically instigate a sweeping ‘anti-corruption purge’ within the Saudi government (Kinninmont). During the crackdown, several hundred members of the House of Saud were arrested and detained within the luxurious five-star Ritz Carlton hotel in Riyadh. Those arrested included major government officials, such as the Minister of Economy and Planning and the prominent son of former King Abdullah and head of the National Guard, Prince Miteb bin Abdullah, who ultimately agreed to pay an out-of-court settlement of around US$1 billion (Kinninmont). Major businesspeople including Prince Waleed bin Talal (the country’s richest man and one of TIME Magazine’s top 100 most influential people of 2008) were also arrested, as well as the head of the MBC media company, Waleed al-Ibrahim, who had previously resisted MBS’s offer to purchase the company (Kinninmont). Certainly, both the motives for the anti-corruption purge and reactions within the extended royal family – including the possibility of mobilisation or retaliation against the current leadership – remain disputed within scholarship, given that politics within the House of Saud is largely hidden to outsiders (Kinninmont). Kinninmont (248) argues that while many of the individuals who were arrested were widely reputed for their involvement in ‘systemic’ corruption (including contractual bribery and nepotism), the charges utilised may also have been, on the other hand, ‘politically selective’, particularly towards opponents of MBS. In any respect, the corruption crackdown was both a political risk and “a populist move at a time of austerity” that enabled MBS to “send certain messages to the country’s traditional elites”. The reconfiguration of power was not limited to the royal family. Rather, King Salman and MBS also boldly confronted the draconian Islamic institution, ‘the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice’, with structural changes which thereby reconfigured the role of the religious clerics and drastically reduced the authority of the notorious ‘religious police’ or mutawa. The mutawa (fig. 4) were assigned the duty of patrolling public spaces and enforcing (or punishing the violation of) strict adherence to Islamic lifestyle and moral conduct (Arab News; Kinninmont; Davidson). Observance of norms and social behaviours under the scrutiny of the mutawa included, but were not limited to, conservative dress code (such as mandating women’s head covering, the hijab), prayer and mosque attendance (including the mandated closure of shops), gender segregation in public spaces, and prohibiting engagement with, or promotion of, ‘Western’ products, activities or customs, such as popular culture texts (music and film), Barbie dolls, celebration of holidays (Christmas, Valentine’s Day), and even the selling of dogs and cats as pets (Sydney Morning Herald; Associated Press). Figure 4: A group of mutawa(usually accompanied by a police officer) patrolling public spaces in Saudi Arabia, identified by their shorter thobes (Arab male dress) and lack of agal (black ring) atop their headdress (shemagh). The sharp curtailment of the powers and privileges of the religious police by King Salman and MBS particularly “came as a major relief for more liberal Saudis unhappy with such restrictions”, not only representing a significant aspect of social and cultural change in the Kingdom but also arguably symbolising the Saudi government’s dedication to renewed nationalism in parallel with the growing momentum of globalisation, modernity, and human rights and social liberalisation trends and movements around the world (Habibi 7). In line with MBS’s championing of Saudi youth and his father’s ‘Vision 2030’ goals, the end of the 2010s was characterised by the introduction of landmark reforms including lifting the prohibition on women driving, introducing cinemas, and allowing women to access government services without the permission of a male ‘guardian’ (Kinninmont). To the surprise of many, tourism, sports, and entertainment events have also been heavily endorsed by the Saudi government, who have sought to diversify Saudi Arabia’s income sources, increase investment and talent, and reduce its dependency on oil in recent years. Many of these events, such as the 2018 Arab Fashion Week, represented a first for Saudi Arabia; other events, such as the debut of the 2018 ‘Diriyah ePrix’, represented the first ever Formula E race in the Middle East – a single-seater motorsport championship involving ‘next generation’ electric cars (Arab News). The 2018 Diriyah ePrix was also accompanied by a three-day complimentary festival headlined by some of the world’s biggest artist including David Guetta, Enrique Iglesias, The Black Eyed Peas, and One Republic (Arab News). In 2024, the entertainment industry remains a key investment for the House of Saud, with the specific aim of persuading its nationals to “do their leisure spending domestically” (Hope). In a recent article published by Vanity Fair, a blossoming ‘bromance’ between MBS and Hollywood actor Johnny Depp has also reportedly culminated in a “seven-figure annual contract” for Depp “to promote Saudi Arabia’s cultural renaissance” (Hope). As Hope accurately conveys, MBS continues to demonstrate that ‘deciphering’ his “increasingly consequential moods, methods, and moves” is no easy feat. What is certain, however, is that the “the traditional pillars of Al-Saud rule” characterised by an archaic system of distribution of power among members of the large royal family, together with an “informal pact with religious clerics and oil wealth”, continue to be weakened by the current leadership (Kinninmont 247). These changes intend to “preserve the power of the monarchy while transforming it dramatically from within” (Kinninmont 247). As such, with the ‘Vision 2030’ development plan successfully underway, government-led actions and policies of the House of Saud demonstrate ambitions for “new authoritarian populism, centring on a discourse of security, technological advancement, youth, social and economic liberalisation, and nationalism” (247). The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, thus, remarkably exemplifies the short-term development achievements and continuing potential of a state under a regime of absolute monarchy; as MBS (fig. 5) asserts in a public statement, “we are confident about the future of Saudi Arabia … . Our people will amaze the world again” (Al-Saud). Figure 5: MBS introducing the launch of the Vision 2030 at a press conference, 2016 References Al-Farsy, Fouad. Saudi Arabia: A Case Study in Development. Routledge, 2023. 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Attention to disability in child protection policies across four liberal welfare regimes

ABSTRACT How child protection and welfare policies address the disability community is a matter of utmost importance and urgency in the context of well-established inequalities. We present a policy content analysis of national policy documents across the United States, Northern Ireland, Australia, and the Republic of Ireland through the theoretical frame of a welfare regimes typology. Key findings include the conflation of disability with vulnerability in all but one context. Also evident is a lack of overt definition of disability, and opportunities for developing specific jurisdictional guidance and regulations focussed on embedding best practices in supporting disabled clients at all system levels.

For every action a reaction? The polarizing effects of women's rights and refugee immigration: A survey experiment in 27 EU member states

AbstractBuilding on research on cultural threat‐induced polarization, we investigate the effect of the individual‐level salience of cultural threats on polarization between social liberals and conservatives. In a unique survey experiment conducted with 129,000 respondents nested in 208 regions in 27 European Union (EU) member states, we manipulate the presence of two cultural threats, women's rights, and refugee immigration, to test their polarizing effects on social liberals’ and social conservatives’ support for traditional values. We find that priming the threat of refugee immigration polarizes conservatives and liberals equally. Yet, introducing the salience of women's rights leads to lower preferences for traditional values, particularly among more liberal respondents. Our findings demonstrate: 1) the study of backlash should distinguish individuals by their predisposition to backlash, rather than studying the population as a whole; and 2) social conservatives’ backlash should be studied conjointly with social liberals’ counter‐reactions to backlash. Future research may investigate why different cultural threats provoke different reactions.

Should we all be feminists? Development of the Liberal Feminist Attitudes Scale

IntroductionThe current social zeitgeist is characterized different feminist tendencies, some of which are embedded in a neoliberal logic. Although the impact of modern mainstream feminism on the individual and society is a subject of critical scholarly debate, there is a lack of suitable instruments to measure the complexity of modern feminist attitudes.MethodsIn three studies, we developed a scale assessing liberal feminist attitudes and tested its factor structure and validity. In Study 1, we generated an item pool capturing liberal feminist attitudes and presented it to a sample of N = 473 with scales for Ambivalent Sexism (hostile and benevolent), Social Dominance Orientation, System Justification, Neoliberal Beliefs, and the self-labeling as a feminist. In Studies 2 (N = 310) and 3 (N = 214) we aimed at replicating the factor structure of the LFAS from Study 1 and confirmed the construct and criterion validity with measurements of the constructs Self-Identification as a Feminist, Personal Progress, Conformity to Feminine Norms and a concrete behavioral measure that captured the willingness to receive information about feminism in the future.ResultsExploratory factor analysis (Study 1) yielded a 4-factor structure with 17 items-the Liberal Feminist Attitudes Scale (LFAS). In Studies 2 and 3, this 4-factorial model showed excellent model fit, internal consistency and convergent as well as discriminant and criterion validity, at least within a particular demographic (i.e., German students).DiscussionThe LFAS holds the potential to provide psychologists with a tool to examine and analyse liberal feminist attitudes comprehensively.

Intersectionality and humanity: A keynote for “remapping the feminist global”

ABSTRACT That Modern Feminist Thought shares its lineage with the liberal Enlightenment and Humanism has continued to render certain feminist practices assimilable to the colonial-racial regime of knowledge that has long underpinned what we normatively uphold as political modernity and its foundational assumptions. This article, originally presented as a conference keynote address, revisits the familiar feminist aporia through exploring the multiple genealogies of feminisms to highlight their theorizations of difference, the human, and other ways of being and caring. It also reconsiders how “intersectionality” – a concept originally forwarded as an alternative legal doctrine yet extensively deployed for various political ends such that the term appears to have lost its original relevance for some – can be repurposed as a critical methodology with which to challenge the universalism of liberal humanism/feminism and the attendant compartmentalization of academic knowledge, but ultimately, to strengthen coalitional possibilities. The article addresses how some of the largely North America-based conversations can resonate transnationally and effectively with some of the most urgent feminist engagements that have unfolded across and beyond plural “Asias,” however imagined.

Неолиберализмът на Фридрих фон Хайек като опит за разобличаване на колективизма и централизираната икономика

The article is dedicated to the socio-philosophical legacy of Friedrich von Hayek, one of the founders of neoliberalism and a representative of the Austrian School of Economics. In this regard, this text is an attempt to rethink Hayek's work in three main aspects: as an initiator of the return of liberalism to its ideological foundations from the Enlightenment, as an ideologue of neoliberalism and as a consistent critic of Keynesian capitalism and socialism. Here are some weaknesses in his teaching, both in terms of capitalism and in terms of social liberalism and socialism.

Strengthening Religious Moderation Through the Core Values of Islamic Boarding School Education

This research explores how the core values embedded in Islamic boarding school education contribute to developing a moderate and inclusive form of Islam. This study will focus on the impact of these values on individuals within the pesantren environment and, consequently, on broader societal dynamics. The approach employed in this research is qualitative, precisely a literature review type, which is a problem-solving method that seeks data sources, both primary and secondary, in the form of books, journals, essays, articles, and other document data. Data analysis in this study used content analysis techniques. The study results found that Islamic boarding school education is a vital moral force in Indonesia's education system, shaping unique social values like local wisdom within its distinct subculture. The research highlights strengthening these values as a novel foundation for Islamic moderation, presenting two education models. The innovative use of social construction theory identifies stages in value transmission, habitualization, and transformative shifts, enriching discourse on Islamic education. Urging a redefinition of education, the study emphasizes the coexistence of Islamic values with global trends. Pursuing moderate Islamic education aligns with togetherness, justice, tolerance, consultation, and social liberation, marking a significant stride in educational research and practice. This research explores the process of transmitting social values in Islamic boarding schools with a conceptual foundation of moderate Islamic education, emphasizing an inclusive paradigm for Islamic values alongside global trends.

Are tradition and modernity antagonistic? Ambedkar in and against the postcolonial project

ABSTRACT This paper attempts to demystify the antagonistic relationship between modernity and tradition as construed by Ashis Nandy. As a prominent voice in postcolonial scholarship, Nandy saw modernity as a colonial conception of rights, self, and society. Nandy’s critique of modernity laid the grounds for several projects that rejected the modern consensus for its colonial origins. Juxtaposing Nandy’s reiteration of early anti-modern nationalist thought with a multi-dimensional reading of colonial modernity in contemporary Ambedkarite scholarship, this paper explores the ambivalences of negotiating modern liberalism in a postcolonial order of hierarchical group identities. Despite the close imbrication of modernity with the imperial centre, Ambedkarite scholarship demonstrated how B.R. Ambedkar, synthesized a middle ground, where he incorporated the promise of modernity to liberate the ‘individual’ without dismissing the ‘communal’ collective self, construed by traditions. While postcolonial scholarship is heterogeneous, following Nandy, huge postcolonial melancholia has conflated modernity with coloniality. How do we rethink postcolonial theory from its current culturalist posturing 1 to (re)claim the emancipatory potential of both modernity and tradition? Could it be that Nandy’s anxiety and discomfort with modernity fail to ‘contemporise theory’ 2 ?

Transforming Caste Domination and the Challenges of Structural Transformations and Transformation of Consciousness: Ambedkar, Shankara and Beyond

Caste is a multidimensional reality in history and society, and it has manifested itself through varieties of structures of domination which are simultaneously cultural, economic, political and ideological as caste has also been related in complex ways with structures of class and gender domination. These structures of domination have led to the annihilation of self and society. This led Ambedkar to challenge us for annihilating caste. For Ambedkar, annihilation of caste calls for the realization of each person as an individual and not just a caste person. It also calls for the destruction of caste privileges, discrimination and their scriptural legitimation. However, this call for annihilation mainly has been a structural project without enough attention to the project of transformation of consciousness—self and social. There is a hint of this in Ambedkar’s Annihilation of Caste when he urges us to realize each one of us as unique individuals beyond the holes of caste which is further deepened in his Buddha and His Dhamma. Transformation of consciousness is also suggested in Adi Shankara’s treatise on self, Atmastakam. The essay engages itself with Ambedkar, Shankara, Gandhi and Sri Aurobindo, among others, as they help us in the transformation of caste domination and present a new hermeneutics of self-realization and social liberation. It deals with the simultaneous challenges of structural transformation of caste as well as consciousness of caste at the levels of both self and society which can draw on multiple sources of critique, creativity and transformations in India and the world. Brahminism is the poison which has spoiled Hinduism. You will succeed in saving Hinduism if you will kill Brahminism. There should be no opposition to this reform from any quarter. It should be welcomed even by the Arya Samajists, because this is merely an application of their own doctrine of guna-karma. Whether you do that or you do not, you must give a new doctrinal basis to your religion—a basis that will be in consonance with liberty, equality and fraternity; in short, with democracy. I am no authority on the subject. But I am told that for such religious principles as will be in consonance with liberty, equality and fraternity, it may not be necessary for you to borrow from foreign sources, and that you could draw for such principles in the Upanishads. Whether you could do so without a complete remoulding, a considerable scraping and chipping off from the ore they contain, is more than I can say. (Ambedkar, 2002[1936], p. 303)

Three Worlds: the West, East and South and the competition to shape global order

Abstract Among the many impacts of Russia's war on Ukraine, the most consequential may be in pushing the world in the direction of Three Worlds—the global West, the global East and the global South. One is led by the United States and Europe, the second by China and Russia, and the third by an amorphous grouping of non-western developing nations. These Three Worlds are not blocs or coherent negotiating groups, but loose, constructed and evolving global factions. This article makes four arguments. First, the Three Worlds system has the makings of a fairly durable pattern of global order, shaping struggles over rules and institutions. Second, the Three Worlds system will encourage a ‘creative’ politics of global order-building. The global West and global East will have incentives to compete for the support and cooperation of the global South. Third, there are deep principles of world order that provide a foundation for the Three Worlds competition. Finally, if the global West is to remain at the center of world order in the decades ahead, it will need to accommodate both the global East and the global South, and adapt itself to a more pluralistic world. But in the competition with the global East for the support of the global South, it has the advantage. The global South's critique of the global West is not that it offers the wrong pathway to modernity, but that it has not lived up to its principles or shared sufficiently the material fruits of liberal modernity.

The Future of Conservatism?

AbstractThe Case for Conservatism is the first report of the Onward think tank's Commission on The Future of Conservatism. It examines present discontents and offers a set of principles for addressing them. It argues that Conservatives need to shift their ideological position away from the economic liberalism of Margaret Thatcher and the social liberalism of David Cameron and adopt a position which is socially conservative and economically interventionist in order to rebuild a successful electoral coalition and an effective programme for government. They seek to re‐found Conservatism on the pillars of family, community and nation, and the obligations of citizenship rather than the freedom of the individual. They provide a distinctive voice on where Conservatism has gone wrong and how it should change, but they may struggle to become the dominant voice shaping the party's future, because the doctrines of economic liberalism still command strong support.

The Misunderstanding of Lockean Political Philosophy in the American Founding Era

It has become a historical inertia that the public and academia deem Lock as the foundation of American politics. However, Locke never explicitly supports the separation of power. Unlike Modern Liberalism, there is no clear-cut definition identifying the boundary between the legislative and executive power. It is a common mistake to interpret the Declaration of Independence as originating from Lockean Liberalism. In reality, Lockean political philosophy and DOI bifurcate at several points within the Second Treatise: executive power and legislative power can be owned by the same person; the exercise of executive power can exceed the limits of the legislatures. Besides, the question of the origin of the executive power remains unsolved. This essay will point out these mysteries and academic misunderstandings by explaining that the Law of Nature is the foundational thought of The Second Treatise. This essay will also delineate conflicts in The Second Treatise but argue that the divine intention is the resolution to all the self-contradictions. This divine intention is set up by both normative and historical threads.

Christianity and Law in the Enlightenment

The European and American Enlightenment movements of 1688 to 1815 transformed the Western legal tradition, notably in areas of constitutional law, criminal law, private law, legal and political theory, and legal education. Particularly the American and French Revolutions effected massive and sometimes violent changes to traditional patterns of law, politics, and society — separating church and state and placing a new premium on democratic rule of law by the general will and public opinion. These legal reforms were grounded in part in new Enlightenment liberal beliefs in deism, rationalism, individualism, and nationalism — ideas that came to strong expression in the many new constitutions and codes issued in the later 18th and 19th centuries. Even so, Enlightenment legal reformers often worked side by side with Christian legal reformers, and they reconstructed traditional Christian legal teachings more than they created laws anew. As a consequence, until the mid-19th century, there was more continuity than discontinuity between Enlightenment-based legal teachings and practices and those of the Western Christian tradition. The Enlightenment, however, provided new secular logics for many of the traditional laws that it adopted and then adapted, and these secular teachings would later fuel the more strident post-Christian, if not anti-Christian, legal campaign of modern liberalism.